I. Scope of Rules - One Form of Action

Rule 1. Scope of rules.

These rules shall govern the procedure in the circuit courts in all suits or actions of a civil nature with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.  

History. Amended November 18, 1996, effective March 1, 1997; amended May 24, 2001, effective July 1, 2001

Rule 2. One form of action.

There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action."  

History. Amended May 24, 2001, effective July 1, 2001

Addition to Reporter's Notes, 2001 Amendment: - The second sentence, which provided that actions in equity were to be brought in chancery court and actions at law in circuit court, has been deleted in conformity with Constitutional Amendment 80, under which the circuit courts are the state's "trial courts of original jurisdiction." The effect of this change in the rule is to merge law and equity, as contemplated by Amendment 80. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed with respect to the corresponding federal rule, "law and equity are procedurally combined; nothing turns now upon the form of the action or the procedural devices by which the parties happen to come before the court." Ross v. Bernhard,  396 U.S. 531, 540 (1970).  

Section 6(B) of Amendment 80 authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate rules governing the organization of circuit courts into subject matter divisions. Administrative Order No. 14, adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to this authorization, requires that the circuit judges of each judicial circuit "establish the following subject-matter divisions in each county of the circuit: criminal, civil, juvenile, probate, and domestic relations." However, the order expressly provides that this designation of divisions "is for the purpose of judicial administration and caseload management and is not for the purpose of subject-matter jurisdiction." At all times, a circuit judge has "the authority to hear all matters within the jurisdiction of the circuit court and has the affirmative duty to do so regardless of the designation of divisions."  

The merged system is to be contrasted with and distinguished from the prior practice in Arkansas during the period in which chancery courts had not been created in all counties. In counties without chancery courts, the circuit court "was a court of dual jurisdiction, the judge presiding in one division or 'on the law side' as a superior court of common law, and also sitting in chancery as judge of a court of equity ... ." Morgan Utilities, Inc. v. Perry County,  183 Ark. 542, 547, 37 S.W.2d 74, 77 (1931). With the merger of law and equity, there are not separate law and equity "sides" of the circuit court.  

Although law and equity have been merged, equitable principles may be applied where appropriate. This has been so in the federal courts. E.g., Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po,  336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949) ("Notwithstanding the fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the substantive principles of Courts of Chancery remain unaffected"); In re United States Brass Corp.,  110 F.3d 1261, 1267 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Ever since law and equity were merged in the federal courts . . . more than a half century ago, the courts have had a free hand in importing equitable defenses into suits at law"). Moreover, the merger does not alter substantive rights. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A.,  527 U.S. 308, 322 (1999).